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This being so, no one should still be cornered by the question of the matter and how and 
whence it arose. You can hear people saying things like this: if God is matterless, where 
does matter come from? How can quantity come from non-quantity, the visible from 
the invisible, something with limited bulk and size from what lacks magnitude and 
limits? And so also for the other characteristics seen in matter: how or whence where 
they produced by one who had nothing of the kind in his own nature?  
Gregory of Nyssa, Explicatio apologetica in Hexaemeron, 
Patrologiae Graecae 44, 69B-C. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
By his wise and powerful will, being capable of everything, he established for the 
creation of things all the things through which matter is constituted (di’ hôn synistatai): 
light, heavy, dense, rare soft, resistant, fluid, dry, cold, hot, colour, shape, outline, 
extension. All of these are in themselves thoughts (ennoiai) and bare concepts 
(noêmata); none is matter on its own. But when they combine/run together 
(syndramein), they turn into matter (hylê ginetai). 
      G. of Nyssa, Hexameron, PG 44, col 69B-C. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
The corporeal creation is thought of in terms of properties which have nothing in 
common with the divine. And in particular it produces this great difficulty for reason 
(logos), if one cannot see how the visible comes from the invisible, the solid and 
resistant from the intangible, the limited from the unlimited, or what is in every way 
circumscribed by quantitatively conceived proportions from what lacks quantity and 
magnitude, and so on for everything which we grasp as connected with corporeal 
nature. But we can say this much on the subject: none of the things we think of as 
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connected with body is on its own a body –not shape, not colour, not weight, not 
extension, not size, nor any other of the things we think of as qualities (poiotēs). Each 
of these is an idea (logos), but their combination/concurrence (syndromê) and union 
with each other turns into a body (sôma ginetai). So, since the qualities which fill out 
(sumplêrômatikos) the body are grasped by the mind and not by sense perception, and 
the divine is intelligent, what trouble is it for the intelligible (noêtos) being to create 
the concepts (noêmata) whose combination (syndromê) with each other produces 
corporeal nature for us? 
 P. Schaff, H. Wace (eds.). A select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene 
 Fathers of the Christian Church, p. 458. PG 46, 124B-D. 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Take away black, cold, weight, density, the qualities which concern taste, in one word 
all these which we see in it, and the substance vanishes. 
Basil the Great, ‘The Hexaemeron,’ homily 1, §8, p. 56, in De Spiritu 
Sancto etc. 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
There is an opinion about matter which seems not irrelevant to what we are 
investigating. It is that matter arises from (hypostēnai ek) the intelligible (noētos) and 
immaterial. For we shall find all matter to be composed of (synestanai ek) qualities 
(poiotēs), and if it were stripped bare of these on its own, it could in no way be grasped 
in idea (logos). Yet each type of quality is separated in idea (logos) from the substratum 
(hupokeimenon), and an idea (logos) is an intelligible not a corporeal way of looking 
(theôria) at things. Thus, let an animal or a log be presented for us to consider, or 
anything else which has a corporeal constitution. By a process of mental division we 
recognize many things connected with the substratum, and the idea (logos) of each of 
them is not mixed up with the other things we are considering at the same time. For 
the ideas (logoi) of colour and of weight are different, and so again are those of quantity 
and of distinctive tactile quality (idiotês). Thus softness and two-cubit length and the 
other things predicated are not conflated with each other, nor with the body, in our idea 
of them (kata ton logon). For the explanatory formula (hermēneutikos horos) 
envisaged for each of these, is quite individual (idios) according to what it is, and has 
nothing in common with any of the other qualities which we connect with the 
substratum. If, then, colour is intelligible and so is resistance and quantity and the other 
such distinctive (idiomata) properties, and if upon each of these being removed from 
the substratum, the whole idea (logos) of body would be removed: what follows? If we 
find the absence of these things causes the dissolution of body, we must suppose their 
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combination (syndromẽ) is what generates material nature. For a thing is not a body if 
it lacks colour, shape, resistance, extension, weight and the other distinctive properties, 
and each of these properties is not body, but is found to be something else, when taken 
separately. Conversely, then, when these properties combine (syndramein) they 
produce material reality. Now, if the conception (katanoẽsis) of these distinctive 
properties is intelligible (noẽtos), and the divine is intelligible in its nature, it is not 
strange that these intellectual (noeros) origins for the creations of bodies should arise 
from an incorporeal nature, with the intelligible nature establishing the intelligible 
properties, whose combination (syndromẽ) brings material nature to birth. 
P. Schaff, H. Wace (eds.). A select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers of the Christian Church, p. 414. PG 44, 212-213. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Neither Plato nor Aristotle, by matter ὕλη understood corporeal substance, whatever 
the moderns may understand by that word. To them certainly it signified no positive 
actual being. Aristotle describes it as made up of negatives, having neither quantity, 
nor quality, nor essence. And not only the Platonists and Pythagoreans, but also the 
Peripatetics themselves declare it to be known neither by sense, nor by any direct and 
just reasoning, but only by some spurious or adulterine method, as hath been observed 
before. Simon Portius, a famous Peripatetic of the sixteenth century, denies it to be any 
substance at all, for, said, Nequit per se subsistére, quia sequerétur, id quod non est in 
actu esse in actu. If Jamblichus may be credited, the Egyptians supposed matter so far 
from including aught of substance or essence that, according to them, God produced it 
by a separation from all substance, essence, or being, ἀπὸ οὐσιότητος ἀποχισθείσης 
ὑλότητος. That matter is actually nothing, but potentially all things, is the doctrine of 
Aristotle, Theophrastus, and all the ancient Peripatetics. 
George Berkeley, Siris, 317, p. 146. In vol. 5, Luce and 
Jessop edition. 
 
 
 
